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THE HIDDEN ECONOMY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
ANNE C. DAILEY*
INTRODUCTION
[I]t is no accident that the cognitive approach gives us no way to
know what the subject will think of next. We cannot possibly know
this, unless we have a detailed understanding of what he is trying to
do, and why. For this reason, a really satisfactory theory of the
higher mental processes can only come into being when we also
have theories of motivation, personality, and social interaction.
The study of cognition is only one fraction of psychology, and it
cannot stand alone.
-Ulric Neisser, Cognitive Psychology
This Article makes three related observations about the
relationship between law and economics scholarship and cognitive
psychology. First, the slow but steady incorporation of cognitive
psychology into the field of law and economics is a positive, but vastly
insufficient, step in the direction of developing an economic approach
to law premised upon empirical insights about human behavior and
decisionmaking. I argue that the usefulness of cognitive psychology is
limited by its subject matter and, in particular, its failure to
comprehend the important role that unconscious emotions and
irrational motives play in human affairs. Second, psychoanalysis is
the only empirical psychology directed to understanding the
mechanisms of human irrationality and, as such, should be an
essential tool for the economic study of law. Finally, I observe that
what psychoanalytic research offers law and economics is, in part, an
economic theory of the mind. The economic theory gives us a model
for understanding how internal mechanisms of exchange affect our
transactions in the world. The economic model does not capture the
full psychoanalytic account of mental life, but its ideas about
emotional energy and its commerce, the psychic transactions between
unconscious and conscious and between mind and body, and the legal
and political implications of emotional transference, are all vitally
relevant to the economic analysis of law today.
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. Thanks to Steven Ecker
for helpful comments.
1599
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
I. COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS
Economic analysis has without question enjoyed a powerful and
widespread influence within the legal academy over the last few
decades.1 As most first-year law students now learn, economic
analysis studies how individuals act to achieve their goals, or in
economic terms how they maximize their expected utility, under
conditions of scarce resources.2 In law, economic analysis has been
useful both for explaining observed market behavior as well as for
developing norms of conduct that are said to promote, again in
economic terms, the maximization of social welfare.' As presently
conceived, economic analysis rests on the basic assumption that
economic actors are rational decisionmakers who consistently choose
the best means for achieving given preferences or ends.4 Although
the traditional study of market behavior does not require that every
market participant behave rationally, at a minimum the theory
requires that a majority of participants act or react to market
conditions in a rational and predictable manner.5
As investigators have turned in recent years to solving the
problem of empirical market failures, and as the scope of economic
analysis has expanded beyond the traditional sphere of competitive
markets to encompass areas such as family life, criminal behavior, and
race discrimination, the rationality of individual decisionmaking has
itself become the focus of economic inquiry.6 The question of why
1. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23,26-30 (1989).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4 (5th ed. 1998).
3. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1998) (describing positive, prescriptive, and normative functions of the
economic analysis of law).
4. The economic assumption that individuals behave rationally can be defined in
descriptive or normative terms. In descriptive terms, rationality is simply taken to mean
consistently choosing the best means for achieving given ends. In normative terms, rationality
sets limits on available ends by reference to substantive norms such as happiness, goodness, or
profit. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Preface, in THE RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOUR xiii, xiii (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1996). This Article is concerned only with
the descriptive version of rationality.
5. See GARY S. BECKER, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, in THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 153, 167 (1976) (arguing that even irrational firms and
households must respond rationally to changed circumstances); Kenneth J. Arrow, Rationality
of Self and Others in an Economic System, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN
ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 201, 208 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986)
(arguing that a rationality-based theory of economic behavior must assume both individual and
social rationality).
6. See Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176
(1997).
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markets fail when economic models predict they should succeed and
the problem of applying economic principles to nonmarket
relationships have occasioned what appears to be a growing
dissatisfaction with the traditional assumption that individuals always,
or even mostly, act to maximize their expected utility. Some
economic theorists have attempted to broaden the meaning of
rational self-interest to include behavior that, on the surface at least,
appears irrational or altruistic.' Dissatisfaction has led others to
abandon economic analysis altogether.8 But a growing number of
economists have turned their attention to studying the cognitive
processes, both conscious and unconscious, that underlie the
phenomenon of human choice.
Cognitive psychology is best known as the science of human
information processing.' Researchers in the field carry out exper-
imental studies of perception, memory, computation, judgment,
attention, language, problem-solving, and related mental processes in
an effort to understand "the kinds of information we have in our
memories and the processes involved in acquiring, retaining, and
using that information.' '10 The field of cognitive psychology is a
relatively new science. William James had included chapters on
attention, memory, and reasoning in his 1890 book The Principles of
Psychology," but it was not until World War II brought advances in
communications, engineering, computer programming, artificial
intelligence, and linguistics that human information processing
became a subject of experimental study.12 The "cognitive revolution"
that occurred at this time challenged the field of "mindless
behaviorism" that, by focusing on stimulus-response reflexes, ignored
7. Two examples of this approach are ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON:
THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988), and Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and
Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARv. L.
REV. 1003 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Behavioral Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response
to Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577 (1998); Arthur Allen Leff, Economic
Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
9. See, e.g., KARL HABERLANDT, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1994); MICHAEL G.
WESSELLS, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1982).
10. WESSELLS, supra note 9, at 1-2; see also ULRIC NEISSER, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 4
(1967) (defining the term "cognition" to include "all the processes by which the sensory input is
transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used").
11. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 380-433 (chapter on attention),
605-49 (chapter on memory), 952-93 (chapter on reasoning) (Harvard College 1983) (1890).
12. See JOHN R. ANDERSON, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 8 (2d ed.
1985).
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the role of consciousness altogether. 13  More than any other
development, observing how we could analyze the intelligent
behavior of a machine encouraged psychologists to abandon a
behavioral focus on observed stimulus-response patterns to ask how
observed stimuli are processed by the mind. 14 Psychologists such as
Herbert Simon, Allen Newell, and George Miller and linguists such as
Noam Chomsky15 rejected the behavioral model of human beings as
"bundle[s] of stimulus-response reflexes,"' 6 preferring instead to see
human behavior in terms of knowledge structures, rules, and plans.17
As Ulric Neisser described it, minds are run according to "a recipe for
selecting, storing, recovering, combining, outputting, and generally
manipulating [information]" coming in through the senses.18
Cognitive psychology is a mental science that views individuals as
essentially rational beings. 19 Although cognitive researchers study the
effects of risk, uncertainty, imperfect knowledge, and other variables
on the decisionmaking process, these variables establish the
parameters for asking, "given them, how individuals will behave
rationally." 20 Behavioral economists and cognitive psychologists are
not oblivious to the existence of irrational behavior, but they believe
that most of what we classify as "irrational" results from
malfunctionings in cognitive processes brought about by mental
biases, heuristics, computational limitations, and informational
barriers. 21  The cognitive approach "is consistent with the
information-processing model of man that views maladaptive
13. See Kenneth S. Bowers & Donald Meichenbaum, Introduction, in THE UNCONSCIOUS
RECONSIDERED 1, 1 (Kenneth S. Bowers & Donald Meichenbaum eds., 1984); Donald
Meichenbaum & J. Barnard Gilmore, The Nature of Unconscious Processes: A Cognitive-
Behavioral Perspective, in THE UNCONSCIOUS RECONSIDERED, supra, at 273,290-91.
14. See, e.g., STEPHEN K. REED, COGNITION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 4 (2d ed. 1988).
15. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, SYNTACTIC STRUCTURES (1957); GEORGE A. MILLER
ET AL., PLANS AND THE STRUCTURE OF BEHAVIOR (1960); ALLEN NEWELL & HERBERT A.
SIMON, HUMAN PROBLEM SOLVING (1972).
16. REED, supra note 14, at 7.
17. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 2 (1999).
18. NEISSER, supra note 10, at 8.
19. Cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis both offer purposive models of human nature
in contrast to behaviorism and some social psychologies that tend to view individual behavior as
the product of environmental influences.
20. NEIL J. SMELSER, THE SOCIAL EDGES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 172 (1998).
21. For the seminal work in this area, see Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955). Some of the biases and heuristics referred to most
often in the economic literature include the confirmatory bias, the hindsight bias, the status quo
bias, and framing effects. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 645-72 (1999);
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1187-92.
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behavior as resulting from dysfunctional rules and heuristics rather
than from nonrational, affective processes. 2 2 In this view, genuinely
irrational behavior in the form of self-destructive or crazy acts may be
the subject of Shakespearean drama, romantic poetry, or extreme
psychopathology, but it is not an important area of serious study for
the social sciences generally. 23 The cognitive model assumes that the
vast majority of people aim to act rationally the vast majority of the
time. When they do not succeed, we may attribute that failure to
incomplete information, uncertain risks, misleading biases, heuristics,
or computational limitations on the mind's ability to take in and
process information from the world.24
Behavioral law and economists are drawn to the fact that
cognitive psychology promises "new and better understandings of
decision and choice." 25 The effort to revise the economic model of
human decisionmaking with findings from cognitive psychology is an
especially important development in law, where much of the behavior
under study has already, almost by definition, failed the traditional
test of rationality: criminal conduct, broken agreements, failed
marriages, injuries to person or property, substance abuse,
employment discrimination, and all other areas in which individuals
appear to make choices that undermine their self-interest and stated
preferences. Important recent applications of behavioral research
have been carried out in many legal areas, including products liability
22. Jeremy D. Safran & Leslie S. Greenberg, Affect and the Unconscious: A Cognitive
Perspective, in THEORIES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS AND THEORIES OF THE SELF 191, 192
(Raphael Stern ed., 1987); see also HOWARD SHEVRIN ET AL., CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS
PROCESSES: PSYCHODYNAMIC, COGNITIVE, AND NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL CONVERGENCES 51
(1996) ("[T]he computational operations of the computer are basic to most views of how
cognitive processes work.").
23. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 19.
[A] superficial objection to the rational-choice model is that some people are not fully
rational and that all of us have lapses from rationality. Economics is concerned with
explaining and predicting tendencies and aggregates rather than the behavior of each
individual person; and in a reasonably large sample, random deviations from normal
rational behavior will cancel out.
Id.
24. Ironically, the neoclassical model of rationality, because it does not study individual
decisionmaking but aggregate market behavior, actually has greater room for recognizing
irrationality in human experience. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 19. In the neoclassical model,
the existence of irrational behavior is irrelevant because, at the aggregate level, individual acts
of irrationality are understood to cancel each other out. See id.
25. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1175. See generally Jolls et al., supra note 3. In their use of
psychology, behavioral law and economics scholars share an affinity for interdisciplinary social
science research that characterized an earlier generation of legal realists, many of whom
approached the study of law and politics from a psychological perspective. Some legal realists
engaged in behavioral research themselves. See, e.g., Underhill Moore & Charles C. Callahan,
Law and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1 (1943).
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law,26 corporations law,27 contract law,28 lawyering, 29 and jury decision-
making.30 This rapidly growing body of literature takes as a principal
assumption that widening the traditional parameters of rationality to
account for cognitive limitations and malfunctionings will transform
economic analysis into a more powerful empirical tool for
understanding and regulating the behavior of legal actors.
This assumption is overly optimistic.3" The aspect of cognitive
psychology that makes it most appealing to law and economics
scholars-namely, its narrow focus on rational thought processes-is
precisely what makes it an inadequate model of human nature for
legal studies. Cognitive psychology gives us important information
about how individuals go about processing information and making
decisions, but it fails to provide a full or satisfying account of human
decisionmaking or human behavior overall.32 Despite an appreciation
for the subjectivity of experience,33 the cognitive model overlooks the
central role that unconscious affects and motivations play in human
decisionmaking. 34 Cognitive psychologists typically take the position
that what might look like the effect of motivation and affect on
reasoning can be explained mostly, or entirely, in information-
processing terms.35 Yet by minimizing the fact that people are often
26. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 21, at 630, 693-96.
27. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 101 (1997).
28. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995).
29. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997).
30. See Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
31. For another view on the problems with behavioral law and economics, see Tanina
Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Some Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law
and Economics Movement (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
32. Robyn Dawes refers to the information-processing trend in cognitive psychology as
"shallow" psychology. Robyn M. Dawes, Shallow Psychology, in COGNMON AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 3 (John S. Carroll & John W. Payne eds., 1976); see also WILMA BuccI,
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE: A MULTIPLE CODE THEORY 10-11 (1997).
33. See NEISSER, supra note 10, at 3.
34. See SHEVRIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 7 ("Cognitive psychology has been far less
interested in affective processes, motivations, fantasies, dreams, and other similar
experiences."); Safran & Greenberg, supra note 22, at 192.
35. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 17, at 211 ("Until the late 1980s many doubted that hot
[affect-laden] cognition even existed, preferring to explain seemingly hot phenomena in terms
of colder mechanisms of information processing."); Dale T. Miller & Michael Ross, Self-Serving
Biases in Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 213 (1975). In recent
years, social cognitive psychologists have become interested in "hot cognition," or cognition
influenced by the individual's mood at the time of judgment. See KUNDA, supra note 17, at 211-
63; Meichenbaum & Gilmore, supra note 13, at 278 (describing growing research evidence of
[Vol. 74:1599
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driven by emotional factors, cognitive psychology cannot account for
behavior motivated by the passions, anxieties, fears, hopes, loves, and
hatreds of everyday life. It does not recognize the full importance of
self-denial, self-destructive urges, weakness of the will, or ambiv-
alence. It cannot provide anything approaching a satisfactory account
of entire spheres of social behavior, including criminal activity, family
life, and group discrimination. 36 It cannot, in fact, account for a great
deal of behavior even in market settings where we would think
people are more consciously inclined to further their material self-
interest. It ignores common emotions like revenge, a basic aggressive
instinct that Holmes once pronounced the origin of law.37
In addition to overlooking the central role of affect in mental life,
cognitive psychology adopts a one-dimensional view of unconscious
mental processes. The cognitive understanding of the unconscious is
limited to rational processes for assimilating and processing
information taken in through the senses.38 The cognitive unconscious
"is a fundamentally adaptive system that automatically, effortlessly,
and intuitively organizes experience and directs behavior. ' '39 The idea
of a cognitive unconscious explains how we drive a car or remember
faces, but it does not explain why, for example, a person might
unconscious "biasing processes" for the role affect plays in modulating cognitions and
metacognitions); Paul Slovic et al., Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in COGNITION
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 32, at 165. For economic perspectives on affect, see
Randall Collins, Emotional Energy as the Common Denominator of Rational Action, 5
RATIONALITY & SoC'y 203 (1993), Jack Hirshleifer, The Affections and the Passions: Their
Economic Logic, 5 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 185 (1993), and Guillermina Jasso, Choice and
Emotion in Comparison Theory, 5 RATIONALITY & SoC'Y 231 (1993). Even the theory of
cognitive dissonance, originally developed by Leon Festinger, went from being a theory about
how conflicting attitudes can generate unpleasant tension or distress to a theory about
maintaining a rational self-perception. See KUNDA, supra note 17, at 217. For an early
collection of essays on affect and cognition, see COGNITION AND AFFECT (John S. Antrobus
ed., 1970).
36. One very promising area of research is the study of stereotyping being carried out by
social cognitive psychologists. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 17, at 313-93; Jody Armour,
Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L.
REV. 733 (1995); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161
(1995).
37. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 2 (1881).
38. "In the cognitive unconscious, there is great rationality in the ubiquitous computational
and associative problem-solving processes required by memory, perception, judgment, and
attention." Adolf Grinbaum, A Century of Psychoanalysis: Critical Retrospect and Prospect, in
FREUD: CONFLICT AND CULTURE 183, 184 (Michael S. Roth ed., 1998).
39. Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 710 (1994). Cognitive psychology has intellectual roots in the work of
nineteenth-century German physiology. For a brief history of German physiology and its
connection to Holmes's jurisprudence, see Anne C. Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48
DUKE L.J. 429 (1998).
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suddenly develop an inability to eat in public without experiencing
debilitating physical symptoms, 40 be unable to complete a major
writing assignment, or subject himself repeatedly to disappointment
in love. Given its narrow focus on information processing and other
rational processes, cognitive psychology does not account fully for
common psychological phenomena, such as reaction-formation,
denial, rationalization, obsession, paranoia, dissociation, phobia,
repression, regression, and transference, all of which operate to some
extent at an unconscious level and cannot be explained by cognitive
processes alone. Overall, because cognitive psychology remains
"explicitly concerned with the fashion in which incoming stimulus
information is processed in order to extract meaning from it,"'41 it
cannot grapple in any serious way with the effect that unconscious
emotions, motivations, and conflicts have on everyday conscious
behavior.4 2
Overlooking the central role that unconscious affects and
motivations play in human decisionmaking creates serious problems
for the study of law. To begin with, understanding the irrational
factors in human behavior is crucial for a fully-informed
consideration of specific legal rules and practices. We may not need a
psychoanalytically-informed model of human behavior to make
running a stop sign a crime, but most regulatory efforts are not so
straightforward. Although people like to think of themselves as
acting rationally and as living in a rationally-organized world, rarely
does human behavior resemble the calculated moves on a chessboard.
We want law to be rational, but we also need to know it operates in a
world-and is the product of a world-that is not always rational and
where meaning is not always transparent. Understanding this does
not mean that law must take account of unconscious feelings and
motivations in every case. But it does compel greater appreciation
40. See SHEVRIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 5. The authors explain:
One of our patient-subjects described ... his inability to eat in public without
experiencing an intense headache, palpitations, a sudden need to defecate, sweatiness,
and shortness of breath. He had no way of understanding why he should be so anxious
and distressed when performing so simple an act as eating in public, something he had
been doing easily for years. He was willing to concede that his behavior was indeed
irrational.
Id.
41. Safran & Greenberg, supra note 22, at 196.
42. Some social cognitive psychologists attempt to grapple more directly with the influence
of motivations and affect on decisionmaking. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 17. Ironically, the
author of the seminal work in the field, Ulric Neisser, emphasizes the importance of
psychodynamic factors. NEISSER, supra note 10, at 279-305.
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for the complexity of human behavior and the likelihood that in many
situations individuals will not respond in a systematically rational way
to legal incentives and disincentives.
When Holmes established the reasonable person standard in law,
for example, he never believed that the standard accurately reflected
the reasonableness inherent in human nature. To the contrary, he
viewed the law as a vehicle by which civilizing forces could be brought
to bear on the elemental human passions and instincts. 43 Efforts to
civilize can become unjust or ineffective, however, when law ignores
the conditions of human nature. This concern becomes most pressing
when the conduct being regulated is complex or the consequences of
law-breaking are severe. We should want to know more about
unconscious motivations and emotions in considering legal rules
governing, for example, the death penalty, the standard of consent in
date rape, the reliability of criminal confessions, the availability of
teenage abortion, the intractable problems of racial discrimination,
the dynamics of sexual harassment, and the best interests of the
child." Just as a psychological theory incapable of confronting the
complexity and obscurity of human behavior will not help us to
understand the causes and meaning of false confessions, parental
ambivalence, or women's inequality in the workplace, so too a legal
system blind to such complexities will likely fail in its efforts to
regulate such conduct. Cognitive psychology leaves us ill-equipped to
evaluate commonplace legal issues such as allegations of
discrimination,' 5 predictions of future dangerousness, assertions of
parental unfitness, and claims for emotional pain and suffering.
Perhaps more fundamentally, cognitive psychology reinforces a
model of rational decisionmaking that, standing alone, has an
impoverishing effect on the basic normative structure of our
constitutional order. In a world where unconscious feelings and
motivations do not matter, self-reflection is not an important virtue.
As long as people are transparent to themselves and others,46
sustained self-inquiry is not essential for deliberative decisionmaking
on matters of personal or public importance. "The rational survives
43. See Dailey, supra note 39, at 439-46.
44. This list obviously represents a very small sample. I leave to future work the task of
distinguishing in a systematic manner those doctrinal areas where the complexity of human
nature should be taken into account for purposes of legal decisiomaking and those where it
need not be an important factor.
45. But see supra note 36.
46. See generally JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE
SOUL (1998), for a critique of transparency.
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in the contemporary social sciences but, except in [non-cognitive]
psychology, the link with reflective capacity has largely dissolved, and
the idea of a virtuous life derived from reason seems to have
disappeared altogether. 4 7 In such a rational world, our conception of
individual rights artificially narrows. For example, the right of free
speech is valued because it protects the communication of known
preferences and ideas rather than because it fosters the personally
and politically transformative effects of public debate on matters of
collective importance. Protection for personal autonomy, too, loses
its connection to a meaningful conception of individual choice that
accounts for the unconscious emotions, motives, and conflicts that
disrupt efforts at self-knowledge and self-direction. 8 Without an
understanding of these irrational elements in human nature, the ideal
of individual autonomy becomes a shallow, even false and
rationalized, version of self-government and self-control. Ultimately,
we sacrifice a sense of citizenship as involving more than the
satisfaction of perceived preferences, one in which membership in the
polity involves an important degree of personal self-reflection and
public deliberation on issues of social and political importance.
In a world where people are often motivated to act for reasons
they do not well understand or know, the loss of self-reflection as an
important virtue in public life can threaten the very foundations of
democratic self-government. The failure to attend to the irrational
elements in human nature leaves us collectively vulnerable to
irrational outbreaks of a potentially violent and politically-
destabilizing character:
If the source of irrationality lies within, rather than outside, the
human realm, the possibility opens up of a responsible engagement
with it. Psychoanalysis is, in its essence, the attempt to work out
just such an engagement. It is a technique which allows dark
meanings and irrational motivations to rise to the surface of
conscious awareness. They can then be taken into account, they
can be influenced by other considerations, and they become less
liable to disrupt human life in violent and incomprehensible ways.4 9
The history of McCarthyism and the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II are only two recent examples in this
47. SMELSER, supra note 20, at 169.
48. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986) ("The ideal of personal
autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it
through successive decisions throughout their lives."); Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26 (1986) (noting the importance of self-knowledge to
the Kantian conception of freedom).
49. LEAR, supra note 46, at 31.
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country of the potential for irrational fears to surface in the political
realm. The fact that the successes of McCarthyism depended in part
on the suppression of speech illuminates the important role that free
expression can play in integrating irrational feelings and desires into
the democratic life of the polity. By allowing individuals the
opportunity to express themselves in speech rather than action, and
by giving the collectivity the opportunity to work through ideas that
threaten to disrupt collective life, the right of free speech helps to
control the effect of irrational emotions and motives in the public
sphere. A psychoanalytic understanding of irrationality speaks to the
deep interconnection between the constitutional values of personal
self-expression and political debate.50
Finally, the cognitive model also obscures the importance of
family life to the development of democratic citizens and, most
especially, to the cultivation of civic virtue in future generations. This
model can lead us to overlook the importance of early affective
relationships to the development of adult citizens equipped with the
emotional and reflective capacities to engage in public discourse,
rational deliberation, and moral decisionmakingi a Autonomous,
rational citizens do not automatically emerge, full-grown, into the
world. Legal and political theorists in recent years have stressed the
importance of social embeddedness to the early acquisition of moral
values, but the inculcation of substantive moral values is not the only
civic function that families serve. Individuals develop the
psychological capacities for autonomy and rationality within the
intimate, affective relationships of the early childhood years, and
especially within the earliest emotional exchanges with a maternal
figure.53 Psychoanalytic work on object relations supports the idea
50. These two First Amendment values are generally considered independent. See, e.g.,
OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996) ("Speech is valued so importantly in the
Constitution, I maintain, not because it is a form of self-expression or self-actualization but
rather because it is essential for collective self-determination.").
51. This point is explored in greater depth in Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 1787 (1995); Anne C Dailey, Striving for Rationality, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2000) (reviewing LEAR, supra note 46).
52. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d
ed. 1984); Benjamin R. Barber, Liberal Democracy and the Costs of Consent, in LIBERALISM
AND THE MORAL LIFE 54, 62 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989); Susan Moller Okin, Humanist
Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE, supra, at 39, 41; Michael J. Sandel, The
Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 POL. THEORY 81, 90 (1984).
53. See, e.g., ERIEK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 137-38 (2d ed. 1963).
We are not saying here that their treatment in babyhood causes a group of adults to
have certain traits-as if you turned a few knobs in your child-training system and you
fabricated this or that kind of tribal or national character. In fact, we are not
discussing traits in the sense of irreversible aspects of character. We are speaking of
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that a strong sense of an individual self, distinct from the world,
develops from the infant's relationship with the primary caregiver.5 4
"The individual," as one psychoanalyst describes, "begins to emerge
from the infant-mother dyad largely in response to the
communications" between child and caretaker." How citizens
acquire the capacity for rational thought, autonomous decision-
making, and the habits of critical thinking, how subsequent relations
in the family, school, and work can build on or disrupt the
development of these capacities, 56 and how law can inhibit or facilitate
these capacities, are all questions that, because they involve
emotional and dynamic factors not readily accessible to conscious
thought, cannot be answered by cognitive psychology alone.
II. THE SCIENCE OF IRRATIONALITY
A behavioral economist might defend the use of cognitive
psychology on the simple ground that it is the only empirical science
of mental processes that now exists. In that view, the recognition of
unconscious emotions and motivations leads inexorably to the
untenable conclusion that "people's behavior is unpredictable,
systematically irrational, random, rule-free, or elusive to social
goals and values and of the energy put at their disposal by child-training systems. Such
values persist because the cultural ethos continues to consider them "natural" and does
not admit of alternatives. They persist because they have become an essential part of
an individual's sense of identity, which he must preserve as a core of sanity and
efficiency. But values do not persist unless they work, economically, psychologically,
and spiritually; and I argue that to this end they must continue to be anchored,
generation after generation, in early child training; which child training, to remain
consistent, must be embedded in a system of continued economic and cultural
synthesis.
Id.
54. See, e.g., W. RONALD D. FAIRBAIRN, PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES OF THE
PERSONALITY 163 (1952); MELANIE KLEIN, The Mutual Influences in the Development of Ego
and Id, in ENVY AND GRATITUDE AND OTHER WORKS 1946-1963, at 57, 58-59 (1984)
[hereinafter KLEIN I]; MELANIE KLEIN, The Early Development of Conscience in the Child, in
LOVE, GUILD AND REPARATION & OTHER WORKS 1921-1945, at 248, 248 (1975) [hereinafter
KLEIN II]; D.W. WiNNIcoTr, THE MATURATIONAL PROCESSES AND THE FACILITATING
ENVIRONMENT: STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 39-40 (1965). See
generally JAY R. GREENBERG & STEPHEN A. MITCHELL, OBJECT RELATIONS IN
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY (1983).
55. LEAR, supra note 46, at 134; see also HANS W. LOEWALD, PAPERS ON
PSYCHOANALYSIS 278 (1980) ("The unit of a psychoanalytic investigation is the individual
human mind or personality .... The individual's status in this regard, however, is questionable
and cannot be taken for granted.").
56. Compare Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990), with Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in
the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997).
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scientists. 5 7  The behavioralist contends that the concept of
irrationality itself is inherently unscientific and thus cannot provide a
sound basis for legal rules or policy. In this view, cognitive
psychology offers the best empirical account of human rationality that
we have.
This Section explains why such contentions are mistaken. I
argue that the field of psychoanalysis provides a clinically-grounded,
empirical, and comprehensive - if imperfect- model for
understanding irrational behavior and mental life generally. Despite
attacks on Freud in the popular press and the managed-care
boardroom, many basic psychoanalytic concepts are now considered
the mainstay of clinical psychology, including repression, defenses,
the unconscious, transference, regression, childhood sexuality,
projection, paranoia, identification, internalization, and
rationalization. 8 By studying child development, adult psychology,
psychopathology, and the interaction of these psychological
phenomena with biological and somatic processes, psychoanalytic
researchers and clinicians have identified the existence of certain
patterns of unconscious processes.5 9  This Section reviews
psychoanalytic knowledge about the basic mental processes
underlying irrational behavior and the work that is being done by
clinical, research, and experimental psychoanalysts to establish the
scientific foundation for these ideas. As this brief review shows, the
body of knowledge we call psychoanalysis cannot credibly be
dismissed as the product of misguided speculation, but rather is the
result of careful clinical work and scientific research over more than a
century.
The concept of irrationality has been the centerpiece of
psychoanalysis since the earliest days of Freud's career. Anna 0,
arguably the first psychoanalytic patient, caught Freud's attention
with a cluster of bizarre symptoms, including paraphrasia, squints,
disturbances of vision, paralyses, fugue states, nervous cough,
transitory hallucinations, and a sudden inability to speak her native
German language.60 In his early work on psychopathology, Freud
57. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1175.
5& See generally PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE MAJOR CONCEPTS (Burness E. Moore &
Bernard D. Fine eds., 1995).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 63-78.
60. See JOSEF BREUER & SIGMUND FREUD, STUDIES ON HYSTERIA, reprinted in II THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1893-
1895, at 22-28 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1955). Anna 0 was actually treated by Freud's
friend, Josef Beuer. The treatment was reported to Freud several months later. See id. at x-xi.
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came to the conclusion that irrational occurrences such as paralyzed
legs, compulsive handwashing, or Anna O's mysterious behaviors
were neither organic illnesses nor malingering, but instead were
meaningful expressions of feelings and desires that conflicted with the
individual's conscious intentions, values, and beliefs. 6' Freud's
interest in understanding the phenomenon of irrationality in human
life led him to spend most of his career exploring the unconscious
instinctual drives and repressed infantile wishes that give rise to
symptoms, dreams, parapraxes, and other normal lapses in rational
thought processes.62
Freud devised the term "primary process" to describe the
mechanisms that characterize the formation of symptoms, dreams,
and the arena of unconscious mental life generally.63 The primary
process is so named because it dates back to the earliest years of life. 64
According to Freud, the main characteristics of the primary process
are imagistic thinking, the condensation of disparate mental elements
into composite unities, and the displacement of psychic energy or
affect from one idea to another.6  Freud also believed that the
primary process, which dominates mental life in the infantile period,
is regulated by the pleasure principle: the innate tendency of the
human organism to seek immediate gratification of instinctual urges
without regard for external reality.66 Freud concluded that eventually
the instinctual drive for immediate gratification comes into conflict
with restraints imposed by external reality.67 As the infant develops,
61. See id. at 269.
62- See HEINZ HARTMANN, EGO PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ADAPTATION 4
(David Rapaport trans., 1958).
63. SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS, reprinted in V THE STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1900-1901, at 588-
609 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1953); see also Dale Boesky, Structural Theory, in
PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 58, at 494, 496. In later years, Freud shifted from the
topographical approach that associated primary process with the unconscious to the structural
model that associated primary process with the id. Hans Loewald has referred to primary
process and secondary process as "fundamental, perhaps the most fundamental, concepts in
psychoanalytic theory." LOEWALD, supra note 55, at 178.
64. See FREUD, supra note 63, at 603 ("When I described one of the psychical processes
occurring in the mental apparatus as the 'primary' one, what I had in mind was not merely
considerations of relative importance and efficiency; I intended also to choose a name which
would give an indication of its chronological priority."); see also CHARLES BRENNER, AN
ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 49 (rev. ed. 1973) ("The primary process was
so named because Freud considered it to be the original or primary way in which the psychic
apparatus functioned.").
65. FREUD, supra note 63, at 594-96; see also Jean Schimek & Leo Goldberger, Thought, in
PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 58, at 209,210.
66. FREUD, supra note 63, at 598.
67. See Roberta K. Jaeger & Robert Michels, Adaptation, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note
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the primary process increasingly gives way to more rational, abstract,
and ordered forms of thinking. The secondary process, as it is called,
allows the infant to manage the frustrations imposed by the real
world that prevent the infant from obtaining immediate satisfaction
of instinctual urges.68 The crying infant of six weeks develops into the
young child capable of tolerating the frustration of waiting for her
food to be prepared. As the child increasingly adapts to the demands
of external reality, "[t]he secondary process progressively tames and
inhibits the effects of the primary process. It is ruled by the reality
principle, as a modification of the pleasure principle, in the service of
adaptation and survival. '69 Although Freud often referred to the
opposition between instinctual drives and the ego, the idea that the
ego serves an important role in obtaining external gratification for the
inner needs of the organism was present in Freud's thought from the
beginning. 0
Freud's belief that rational thought, or the secondary process,
develops in service of the individual's instinctual drive gratification
has been questioned by later psychoanalysts. Ego psychologists such
as Heinz Hartmann emphasize the role of autonomous ego capacities,
including motility, memory, and perception, in the development of
the secondary process.71 In this view, "secondary-process thinking is
not simply derived from the primary-process 'drive organization of
memories' but includes 'intrinsic maturational restraining and
integrating factors. ' ' 72 The infant's exercise of perceptual and motor
functions promotes the development of psychic mechanisms for
assimilating and organizing information coming in from the senses.73
Still other psychoanalysts whose work focuses on object relations, or
relations with significant others, emphasize the infant's earliest
58, at 317, 319 ("A person's reality grows coincidentally with the development of the ego, and it
was reality that was seen as preventing immediate satisfaction by prohibition of drive action.").
68. See Schimek & Goldberger, supra note 65, at 211.
69. Id.; see also FREUD, supra note 63, at 566 ("The bitter experience of life must have
changed this primitive thought-activity into a more expedient secondary one.").
70. FREUD, supra note 63, at 567-68.
71. See Schimek & Goldberger, supra note 65, at 213 ("Hartmann and Rapaport stressed
that one had to assume that the secondary process was present from the beginning of
development and had its roots in the biological preadaptedness of the human organism to its
,average expectable enviromnent,' an environment that is intrinsically social as well as
physical.").
72. Id.
73. Freud emphasized, too, that the roots of ego structure are in the perceptual, or "Pcpt.,"
system. SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 14 (Joan Riviere trans. & James Strachey ed.,
1962) ("We shall now look upon an individual as a psychical id, unknown and unconscious,
upon whose surface rests the ego, developed from its nucleus the Pcpt. system.").
2000]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
relationship to its caretaker as an important element in secondary-
process development. Actual interactions between child and parents,
"through identification and internalization, become the basis of
enduring cognitive structures and of the individual's construction of
his or her inner reality. '7 4 In this regard, Hans Loewald describes
how "the psychological constitution of ego and outer world go hand
in hand":
The neonate does not as yet distinguish an ego from an outer
world.... Ego, id, and external reality become distinguishable in
their most primitive, germinal stages. This state of affairs can be
expressed either by saying that "the ego detaches itself from the
external world," or, more correctly: the ego detaches from itself an
outer world. Originally the ego contains everything. Our adult ego
feeling, Freud says, is only a shrunken vestige of an all-embracing
feeling of intimate connection, or, we might say, unity with the
environment.75
Whether the emphasis is on instinctual drive gratification,
autonomous ego development, or object relations, the important
point is that the psychoanalytic model recognizes that the rationality
of the secondary process develops in the context of the more
primitive, primary thought processes characteristic of the infantile
period.
Psychoanalysis teaches that the adult capacity for rational
thought never entirely replaces more primitive modes of thinking and
feeling. No matter what their orientation, all psychoanalysts agree
that adult rational thought remains subject to disruption by these
more primitive, unconscious factors, from the most trivial slip-of-the-
tongue or missed appointment to the gravest errors in judgment or
behavior. On the whole, psychoanalysts adhere to "the persistence of
the primary process throughout life," '76 a condition most evident at
times of stress, serious conflict, physical illness, romantic exhilaration,
and religious ecstasy.77 Sensible economists and cognitive psychol-
74. Schimek & Goldberger, supra note 65, at 216.
75. LOEWALD, supra note 55, at 5 (citation omitted).
76. Schimek & Goldberger, supra note 65, at 214.
77. See Phyllis Tyson & Robert L. Tyson, Development, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note
58, at 395, 396.
Stress, conflict, danger, or frustration evoke modes of functioning more typical of
earlier developmental phases. This is usually referred to as "regression," wherein the
individual reverts, or retreats, to safer forms of satisfaction (drive regression), modes
of relating (regression in object relations), sets of standards (superego regression), or
ways of thinking (ego or cognitive regression).
Id; see also Schimek & Goldberger, supra note 65, at 214.
Psychoanalysts view the development of mental life as "a continuum extending from
the primitive, drive-dominated, and unrealistic primary-process mode (with only the
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ogists would agree that childhood and adolescence are periods during
which individuals acquire the habits of rational thought, but the
habits, once acquired, are treated as essentially fixed and uniform.
What economists and cognitive psychologists miss is that rationality is
not a stable structure we achieve, once and for all, but a continual
process of mediating between unconscious feelings, emotions, and
desires, on the one hand, and external reality, on the other.
Moreover, the persistence of the primary process is a fact to be
embraced rather than deplored. Emotions and thought processes
from this earliest period in our lives, particularly the "oceanic feeling
of oneness" with another or with nature, are what bring romantic joy,
creative inspiration, friendship, and religious meaning to our adult
lives. We need to be aware that modes of thinking from this early
period threaten to disrupt the rational order of our lives in potentially
destructive ways, but we cannot, nor should we wish to, do away with
them altogether.78
Establishing the scientific basis for these psychoanalytic ideas
obviously poses special problems for researchers. Psychoanalysis
deals primarily with unconscious mental events and processes not
amenable to direct study. Experimental research on perception,
cognition, and subliminal awareness has made it clear that
unconscious processes can be studied in the laboratory, but
psychoanalysis involves the more complex areas of unconscious
emotions and motivations. Despite obstacles, however, four avenues
of research show promise.
First is clinical psychology itself. The most important aspect of
clinical research still remains the careful observations of the
experienced analyst in the individual case study. The efficacy of
classical psychoanalysis as a therapeutic endeavor is limited to those
individuals with "analyzable" problems and with the financial and
personal resources to undergo intensive treatment over a period of
many years. As a research tool, however, there is no question about
the efficacy of the psychoanalytic method. "The process of
psychoanalysis remains unparalleled as a method whereby the
most rudimentary secondary-process accompaniment) through intermediary stages-
where primary and secondary processes liberally coexist-to a mode characterized by
a dominance of secondary process, though presumably with some minor influx of the
primary process.
Schimek & Goldberger, supra note 65, at 214.
78. See id. ("In fact, the absence of primary-process indications in a patient's presentation is
to be carefully assessed, as it may indicate severe pathology, in the form of a reliance on too
rigid a defense structure.").
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workings of the human mind may be observed, a method in which
human subjectivity comes under scientific scrutiny."7 9  How to
organize and synthesize the material gathered in the course of
psychoanalytic treatment poses the greatest challenge, given the
complexity of the material and concerns for patient privacy. Steps
are being taken to bring greater scientific objectivity to the
psychoanalytic process and results, including audio-taping one or
more analytic sessions for later review.
Second, researchers in certain areas employ the method of
observation, the most important example being observation of child
development. In the history of psychoanalysis, child observation
began with Freud's observation of his own children and grand-
children, and continued with work by researchers such as Anna
Freud, Margaret Mahler, and Daniel Stern. 0 Third, in addition to the
naturalistic methods of observation, some formal experimental
research is also taking place. "Carefully controlled experimental
studies of attention, perception, memory, learning, dreaming, sensory
deprivation, and hypnotic states have made use of tests and
laboratory techniques developed outside of psychoanalysis and have
significantly widened the scope of psychoanalytic knowledge."81
Finally, researchers in the area of neuroscience are beginning to
explore the material foundation for psychoanalytic events and
processes. Developments in neuro-imaging present the possibility of
some day grounding observed psychoanalytical phenomena in brain
functioning.82 Recent advances in neuroscience bring us back to the
79. Elizabeth Lloyd Mayer, Psychoanalysis and Research, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note
58, at 529, 531. See generally PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS RESEARCH STRATEGIES (Hartvig
Dahi et al. eds., 1988); RESEARCH IN PSYCHOANALYSIS: PROCESS, DEVELOPMENT, OUTCOME
(Theodore Shapiro & Robert N. Emde eds., 1995); Marshall Edelson, Is Testing Psychoanalytic
Hypotheses in the Psychoanalytic Situation Really Impossible?, 38 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD.
CHILD 61 (1983); Enrico E. Jones & Michael Windholz, The Psychoanalytic Case Study: Toward
a Method for Systematic Inquiry, 38 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 985 (1990).
80. See, e.g., ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (rev. ed. 1966);
MARGARET S. MAHLER ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT:
SYMBIOSIS AND INDIVIDUATION (1975); DANIEL N. STERN, THE INTERPERSONAL WORLD OF
THE INFANT: A VIEW FROM PSYCHOANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1985).
81. Mayer, supra note 79, at 530.
82. Fred Levin describes recent theoretical revisions within psychoanalysis "based upon
the convergence of psychoanalytic and neuroscientific discoveries." Fred M. Levin,
Psychoanalysis and the Brain, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 58, at 537, 548. Morton Reiser
at Yale studies the neurobiology of dream imagery with the use of neuro-imaging techniques.
See MORTON F. REISER, MEMORY IN MIND AND BRAIN: WHAT DREAM IMAGERY REVEALS
(1993); MORTON F. REISER, MIND, BRAIN, BODY: TOWARD A CONVERGENCE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND NEUROBIOLOGY (1984); Morton F. Reiser, Converging Sectors of
Psychoanalysis and Neurobiology: Mutual Challenge and Opportunity, 33 J. AM.
PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 11 (1985). The Center for Neuropsychoanalysis at the New York
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question of the physical domain of mental life that occupied Freud's
attention in his early years. Research on all these fronts- clinical,
observational, experimental, and neuroscientific- contributes to the
task of building a comprehensive and empirically-grounded body of
psychoanalytic knowledge directed to understanding the sources and
dynamics of irrationality in human nature.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF MIND
There are many ways of looking at irrational decisionmaking and
behavior from the psychoanalytic perspective. A dynamic approach,
for example, looks at the mechanisms and consequences of repression
and conflict in psychic life. A developmental approach focuses on the
importance of early childhood experiences and maturational forces to
adult experience. In this Section, I suggest that the economic
perspective offers a useful framework for understanding how the
transference of emotions and desires from one context to another
gives rise to irrational thoughts and behavior. What the economic
model offers us is a useful conceptual framework, or metaphor, for
understanding how internal transactions, and in particular the
displacement of unconscious emotions, come to influence our
transactions in the external world.
As originally conceived by Freud, displacement was an economic
concept that referred to the mobility of psychic energy in the mental
system.83 The economic theory of the mind originated with Freud's
early attempt to work out the neurological basis of mental life. In
1895, five years before the publication of The Interpretation of
Dreams, Freud wrote the Project for a Scientific Psychology.84 The
Project-never completed and never published during Freud's
lifetime-was an effort to create "a psychology that shall be a natural
science," one that looks at "psychical processes as quantitatively
Psychoanalytic Institute studies psychoanalytic issues from the perspective of the brain. See
THE BULLETIN OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE AND SOCIETY 1999-2000, at
46-47 (2000); cf Levin, supra, at 538.
In the United States, neurologically informed psychoanalysts such as Reiser at Yale,
Basch and Gedo in Chicago, Schwartz in Washington, D.C., Sashin in Boston, Moore
in Atlanta, and Hadley in Wisconsin, to name just a few, have sought to establish
further clinical correlations between mind and brain, working toward a unified theory
of brain and behavior.
Id.
83. FREUD, supra note 63, at 595-97.
84. SIGMUND FREUD, PROJECT FOR A SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY, reprinted in I THE
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 1886-
1899, at 295 (James Strachey trans. & ed., 1966) [hereinafter I THE STANDARD EDITION].
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determinate states of specifiable material particles."'85 Freud's interest
in the physical forces underlying mental life followed naturally from
his time in the late 1870s at the Vienna Physiological Institute, where
he worked and studied under Ernst Brucke.86 The Project was
Freud's attempt "to discover what form the theory of psychical
functioning will take if a quantitative line of approach, a kind of
economics of nervous force, is introduced into it." 8  As James
Strachey observed, it is a "remarkable truth that the Project, in spite
of being ostensibly a neurological document, contains within itself the
nucleus of a great part of Freud's later psychological theories."88 The
economic model, which began as a theory of the physical forces
underlying psychological phenomena, very quickly became a theory
of psychological forces standing alone.89
As developed by Freud, the economic theory conceptualizes
mental life as an organized system of energy flow. The economic
theory focuses on how instinctual needs originating in somatic
processes generate a level of psychic energy necessary to meet
essential physical needs arising from within and to manage perceptual
stimuli incoming from the world.90 While individuals experience a
relatively constant level of psychic energy during normal waking
states, this can change when instinctual urges or environmental
stimuli increase. Significant increases in psychic energy produce a
state of mental tension that is usually, although not always,91
accompanied by subjective sensations of "unpleasure." 92 When the
level of psychic tension reaches a certain threshold-for example,
85. Id. at 295.
86. Along with Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Hermann Helmholtz, and Carol Ludwig, Brucke
was a member of the famous Helmholtz School, "one of the most remarkable groups of
scientific workers the world has ever seen." BRETr'S HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 635 (R.S.
Peters ed., 1962). This group of scientists shared an opposition to vitalism and a commitment to
a physiological psychology that emphasized the material aspects of mind over transcendent life
forces. See generally Dailey, supra note 39.
87. James Strachey, Editor's Introduction, in I THE STANDARD EDITION, supra note 84, at
283, 283.
88. Id. at 290.
89. Although Freud never again pursued the neurological basis of mental life, his early
work on the Project illuminates the important way in which psychoanalysis, with its emphasis on
instinctual urges, bodily functions, and developmental capacities, attempts to traverse the
seemingly unbridgeable gap between the physical and psychological realms. See Alvin Frank,
Metapsychology, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 58, at 508, 509 (Metapsychology "is a theory
of mind as a bio-psychological entity.").
90. See FREUD, supra note 63, at 565.
91. Increases in tension can also be associated with pleasure. See Frank, supra note 89, at
513.
92. See FREUD, supra note 63, at 598.
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when an individual becomes hungry-the instinctual need becomes
conscious, and the individual focuses his or her attention on ridding
the mind of this unpleasurable tension. An infant, with only primary
process thought mechanisms available, will seek immediate discharge
of this excess tension through hallucinatory or motor activity such as
crying and moving. As the nervous system matures, the excess
tension can be taken up by the more developed secondary process
mechanisms of the ego, which bind excess energy in a way that allows
the individual to tolerate the increased level of tension until discharge
or removal of the stimulus can occur.
Although the economic theory has fallen into relative disfavor in
psychoanalytic circles, its ideas about psychic tension and the mobility
of affect can still help us to understand the several ways in which
minds are vulnerable, or even prone, to irrationality. As already
described, irrationality can result from excessive levels of psychic
energy caused by increases in inner needs or environmental stimuli.
Psychic tension can grow so great that the mind's capacity for binding,
or managing, the increased excitation in the system will be
overwhelmed. 93 As hunger turns to starvation, for example, the
capacity of the ego to tolerate the excess tension reaches its limit, and
the mind, now flooded with excitation, regresses to primary process
mechanisms such as hallucinatory wish-fulfillment and motor
discharge.94 In law, this form of massive system overload is reflected
in doctrines such as temporary insanity and diminished capacity. At
least in certain limited doctrinal fields, courts are relatively good at
recognizing that, in times of obvious stress or trauma, individuals do
not always behave in a rationally purposive manner.
Irrationality, however, is not only a theory of quantitative excess
occurring at times of extraordinary mental stress or trauma. The
mobility of psychic energy-the tendency of unconscious emotions to
be displaced or transferred from one context to another-leads to
more everyday gaps in conscious thought and behavior that cannot be
explained in rational terms. Common occurrences such as forgotten
names, day-dreams, self-defeating behavior, and certain types of
reckless activity all point to the existence of unconscious feelings and
desires that disrupt conscious thought and behavior in seemingly
93. "An overabundance of energy relative to the psychic organizations' capacities for
accumulation and discharge is hypothesized as producing a traumatic state, a profound
overstimulation of the mental apparatus." Frank, supra note 89, at 512.
94. See Sydney E. Pulver, The Psychoanalytic Process and Mechanisms of Therapeutic
Change, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 58, at 81, 87.
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inexplicable ways. The economic theory gives us a model for
understanding these normal, everyday processes in terms of
unconscious emotions and wishes being easily displaced, or
transferred, onto conscious ideas and behavior. Freud described ideas
as becoming "cathected," or invested, with emotional energy derived
from unconscious origins.9 He observed that this emotional energy
can be displaced from one idea to another, or, in the case of hysteria,
from the mind to the body.9 The phenomenon of displacement is a
matter of common observation: we all know that anger at one's boss
can be displaced onto a spouse, disappointment with oneself can be
displaced onto a child, childhood rage toward a parent can be
displaced onto a therapist. Ideas that are associated in time or subject
matter, for example, will facilitate the transfer of affect.97 When it
occurs, displacement is experienced as a momentary, inexplicable
gap, whether trivial (a slip of the tongue) or substantial (the loss of a
job or marriage) in the individual's sense of purposive thought and
behavior. These gaps can also be experienced as leaps forward, such
as what happens at moments of creative breakthrough. In the
psychoanalytic view, the important point is that these intermittent
gaps and leaps characterize minds functioning as they should.98
Freud's economic views on the displacement of emotional energy
form the core of a much broader theory of transference that is a
central component of psychoanalytic theory and practice today. In
the traditional clinical view, transference
is the tendency to repeat, in a current setting, attitudes, feelings,
impulses, and desires experienced or generated in early life in
relation to important figures in the individual's development.
These original figures are primarily the parents but may include
other family members or even persons outside the family who have
assumed important functional roles in actuality.99
Contemporary psychoanalytic theorists view transference more in
terms of the interpsychic relationship between child and parent, or
between patient and analyst, than as a phenomenon that occurs solely
within the mind of the individual. Object relations theorists, for
example, study the role that important early figures, in particular the
maternal figure, have in constituting the child's emerging sense of
95. FREUD, supra note 63, at 595.
96. Id. at 594.
97. See id. at 596.
98. See generally LEAR, supra note 46.
99. Leo Stone, Transference, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 58, at 110, 110.
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self, or ego.10° Unlike traditional psychoanalytic theory, which focuses
on intrapsychic forces, object relations theorists take into account the
importance of early relationships to the child's maturing ego.101 The
earliest exchanges of meaning occur between the maternal figure and
infant, a relationship deemed central to the creation of psychological
structure, including secondary process, ego defenses, and the general
capacity of the individual to handle the stress and frustration of living
in the world.
Broadly speaking, transference captures the process by which the
individual shifts internal meaning to the world.' °2 In this broad sense,
transference stands for the dynamic mechanism of exchange by which
feelings, emotions, and desires internal to the person are enacted in
the world. The phenomenon of transference in psychoanalytic
thought is broader than the view of perception in cognitive
psychology, although both approaches take the individual as an active
participant in the creation of his or her perception of the world.
Cognitive psychologists see this meaning strictly in terms of cognitive
processes; psychoanalysts, on the other hand, see this as a recreation
of deeply embedded emotions, fantasies, wishes, and instinctual
needs. The psychoanalytic view emphasizes the emotional tenor of
transference, as well as the dynamic relationship between the
individual and the world. When this emotional displacement gives
positive and productive energy to love, work, collective endeavors,
and creative achievement, we find life enriched and open to
possibilities. When transference becomes enacted in the world in a
wildly distorted, fixed, or self-defeating way, we observe that
behavior has become irrational.103
The concepts of displacement and transference help to explain
the centrality of the irrational in normal, everyday mental life. The
problem with behavioral law and economics is not its enthusiasm for
rationality per se. Any approach to the study of law that did not
recognize and pursue rational analysis and outcomes would hardly be
100. See generally GREENBERG & MITCHELL, supra note 54. For works by object-relations
theorists, see FAIRBAIRN, supra note 54; KLEIN I, supra note 54; KLEIN II, supra note 54;
WINNICOTI, supra note 54.
101. "[Psychoanalytic object relations theories are] defined as those that place the
internalization, structuralization, and clinical reactivation (in the transference and
countertransference) of the earliest dyadic object relations at the center of their motivational
(genetic and developmental), structural, and clinical formulations." Otto F. Kernberg,
Psychoanalytic Object Relations Theories, in PSYCHOANALYSIS, supra note 58, at 450, 450.
102. See LEAR, supra note 46, at 71-72.
103. See id. at 140.
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useful for legal studies. Rather, the problem lies in the failure to see
how the adult capacity for rational thought is inherently subject to
regular disruptions in ways that affect our behavior in the world.
Psychoanalytic views on the mobility of affect and the transference of
emotions help us to see how unconscious factors give rise to irrational
thought and behavior. The task from the psychoanalytic point of
view is to utilize cognitive processes to bring these unconscious
factors to light and under conscious control. The task from a legal
point of view does not substantially differ. As Holmes recognized,
understanding unconscious factors is essential to designing effective
legal rules and policies. 1°4 It is one of the small ironies of the law and
economics literature that the most well-known model for exploring
the parameters of rationality is the "Prisoner's Dilemma," in which
two prisoners charged with the same crime and facing possible steep
prison terms calculate whether it is better to confess or remain
silent.1 5 One could hardly imagine.a real-life situation more prone to
emotional distortions in decisionmaking brought about by fear,
regret, guilt, rage, denial, confusion, and despair. Law and economics
scholarship should take the important step of recognizing the
dynamic interplay between unconscious emotions and motives, on the
one hand, and our material transactions in the world, on the other.
CONCLUSION
At first blush, economics and psychoanalysis appear to be
situated at opposite ends of the social science spectrum. Economics
studies the world of rational actors in the public marketplace, while
psychoanalysis studies the private world of irrational feelings and
motivations. Economics aims to rationalize behavior at the market or
firm level, while psychoanalysis emphasizes the dynamics of
individual emotions and behavior. Applied economics also rests its
reputation on the rigor of its scientific methods, which include
experimental research, quantifiable data, and testable hypotheses. 1°6
Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, has gained a reputation for
subjective methods, nonquantifiable data, and unverifiable findings.
104. See Dailey, supra note 39, at 447-56.
105. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer, Progress in Behavioral Game Theory, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall
1997, at 167,170.
106. See Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATuRE 11, 12
(1998) ("Mainstream economics employs a powerful combination of methods: methodological
individualism, mathematical formalization of assumptions, logical analysis of the consequences
of those assumptions, and sophisticated empirical field testing.").
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Yet despite these traditional differences in subject matter and
methodology, the gap between the two fields has begun to narrow.
The shift within economics from the study of aggregate market
behavior to the psychology of individual decisionmaking and the shift
within psychoanalysis to more objective research methods are two
areas of recent convergence. The economic theory raises the
possibility of a third connection: the idea that irrationality derives in
part from the normal displacement of unconscious emotions and
motivations onto our everyday lives in ways that affect our material
transactions in the world. The day will hopefully come when law and
economic scholars recognize that irrationality is not simply the
product of distortions in cognitive thinking, but a defining element of
well-functioning minds.

